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INTRODUCTION
When U.S. citizens, like photographers and journalists, are killed
by acts of terrorism abroad while performing their jobs, it sends
shockwaves through the American home front. “[In] the long term, the
sudden death of a loved one may manifest itself as ‘a deep inner
feeling of pain and anguish often borne in silence.”’1 Thus, the pain
and anguish of a loved one may manifest itself as the Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) although individuals react
differently under like circumstances.2
Foreign nationals face many challenges when filing civil claims,
like IIED, in U.S. courts against foreign states.3 Foreign nationals are
faced with the difficult task of breaking through jurisdictional
roadblocks under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in
an effort to hold the foreign state liable for conduct that seriously
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; M.S., Criminal Justice; B.A., Political Science; Dean’s List
honoree.
1
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing
Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1972)).
2
Id. at 31.
3
Id.
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harmed or caused death to a U.S. citizen relative.4 Remedies, such as
the ability to sue a foreign state for supporting terrorist acts, help to
maintain uniformity in U.S. courts and conformity with international
law litigation.5
Before a U.S. state or federal court can hear a case, it has to
exercise jurisdiction over the claim. The court is able to resolve the
issue if there is a “case or controversy” between adverse parties with
legal standing to bring the suit.6 Specifically, U.S. federal courts
“shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”7 The FSIA, a
federal statute, provides the “sole basis” for asserting jurisdiction over
foreign states.8 The FSIA allows a court to remove an essential state
law claim from state to federal court through subject matter
jurisdiction.9 Moreover, the FSIA provides that “in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign stated defendant has been accommodated
inherently in the statute for the acts enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7).”10 Under this statute, U.S. courts have the power to
exercise personal jurisdiction over claims against foreign state
sponsors of terrorism that cause personal injury or death to U.S.
citizens.11
Regardless of the United States’ jurisdiction, foreign states enjoy
sovereign immunity under the FSIA12 unless the foreign national (or
4

Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012).
14A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §3662 (3d
ed. 1998).
6
U.S. Courts, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, (April 11, 2013, 5:00 PM),
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jurisdiction.
aspx.
7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1331.
8
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
9
Id.
10
Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
11
Id. (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 19-23 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)).
12
Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012);
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 USC § 1605(a)(7) (2002).
5
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claimant) asserts an exception, such as the state-sponsored terrorism
exception.13 Foreign states are treated like the U.S. under the FSIA.14
Neither sovereign can have a default judgment entered against it—or a
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of it—unless the
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory
to the court.15 Essentially, the claimant must plead a cause-of-action
that the court can redress.
If a cause-of-action is properly plead by showing substantial
evidence that the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the terrorist
act, a United States citizen, and the foreign state was designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism, U.S. federal courts can exercise subjectmatter jurisdiction over claims which cause death or injury to U.S.
citizens. 16 Subject-matter jurisdiction created a roadblock to recovery
for the Leibovitch family during their suit against the Republic of Iran
in U.S. federal court.17
In that case, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the FSIA and its statesponsored terrorism exception to determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction over essential state law claims against a foreign state
existed.18 In Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, foreign family
members brought suit in a U.S. federal court for injuries that resulted
from Iran’s material support of terrorist actions.19 The district court
dismissed the claims brought by the other members of the Leibovitch
family, asserting that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their
claims because they were not U.S. citizens.20 The Leibovitches
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that subject matter
13

28 USC § 1605(a)(7)(2008).
Id.
15
Michael Rosenhouse, J.D., State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to
Immunity of Foreign States and their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002) (citing n. 29).
16
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 570.
17
Id. at 561-62.
18
Id. at 561.
19
Id. at 562-63.
20
Id. at 563.
14

436
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

jurisdiction existed over their IIED claims arising from S.L.’s injuries
under Israeli law because of S.L.’s status as an American citizen.21
This article analyzes the FSIA and the state-sponsored terrorism
exception to determine whether the Seventh Circuit correctly reversed
the district court. This Comment proposes that the Seventh Circuit
correctly reversed the district court and found that the court had
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Leibovitch’s case. Moreover,
this Comment argues that S.L. could recover because she is a victim
under the state-sponsored terrorism exception. The Comment will
proceed as follows. Part I provides an overview of the FSIA. Part II
addresses case law that helped shape the current state-sponsored
terrorism exception. Then, Part III will analyze the current effect of
the state-sponsored terrorism exception, and explain why the Seventh
Circuit correctly reversed the district court’s ruling. However, to
comprehend the court’s decision, one must understand the FSIA and
the basis for asserting an exception under the Act.
I.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT & U.S. JURISDICTION
A. The FSIA

The FSIA originated in 1976 when foreign states could easily
bypass civil liability to personal injury suits by raising foreign
sovereign immunity.22 Specifically, there were “uncertainties [of] then
current American judicial practices and Department of State policies
with regard to a foreign nation's sovereign immunity.”23 Because of
those uncertainties, U.S. courts refused to extend the sovereign
immunity exception beyond commercial activities to reach public acts

21

Id.
44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 83 (2013); Israel Law Center, FSIA,
(Feb. 4, 2013; 3:00 PM),
http://www.israellawcenter.org/hebrew/page.asp?id=334&show=reports#Foreig
n.
23
Wright, supra note 5.
22
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outside the U.S.24 As a result, “foreign states [used] the FSIA as a
shield against civil liability for violations of the law of nations
committed against [U.S.] nationals overseas.”25 “Consequently,
American victims of International terrorism were deterred from suing
foreign states that supported terrorist organizations” if they could not
point to the commercial activities exception under the FSIA.26 To
combat against international terrorism against U.S. citizens, the statesponsored terrorism exception was enacted.
B. The State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception27 and Subject
Matter Jurisdiction.
To disassemble the FSIA’s shield, victims needed a sword that
would pierce the FSIA’s protection and permit subject matter
jurisdiction over their claims. In 1996, as part of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, (AEDPA), Congress passed a
terrorism exception to the FSIA that granted American citizens the
right to sue foreign states designated as “State Sponsors of
Terrorism.28 Congress’s purpose in lifting the sovereign immunity
24

44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 83 (2013); See Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (1998).
25
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
26
Israel Law Center, FSIA (February 4, 2013, 3:00 PM),
http://www.israellawcenter.org/hebrew/page.asp?id=334&show=reports#Foreign.
27
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(h)(6) (2008); see Michael Rosenhouse, J.D.,
Annotation, State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign States and
their Property under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1,
§ 2.1 (2002) (State-Sponsored Terrorism means “a country the government of which
the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S. C. App. 2405(j), section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.”).
28
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008)) (a “foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case to otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an
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under the AEDPA was to “affect the conduct of terrorist states outside
the U.S. [by promoting] safety of U.S. citizens who travel overseas.”29
As a result of the AEDPA, raising sovereign immunity as a shield
against U.S. jurisdiction was eradicated.30 Foreign states could not
assert sovereign immunity where a victim claims money damages for
personal injuries or death caused by an act of torture,31 extrajudicial
killing,32 aircraft sabotage,33 hostage taking,34 or the provision of

act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision
of material support or resources (as defined in 2339A of title 18) for such an act if
such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or
agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment or agency, except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this
paragraph.”).
29
44B Am. Jur. 2d, International Law § 140 (2013).
30
Id.
31
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(e)(1) (2008) (defines “torture” pursuant to the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, §3(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (b), as “any act, directed
against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or
incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that
individual or third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.”).
32
See id. (defining extrajudicial killing pursuant to the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, §3(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (a) as “a deliberated killing not
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.” This term “does not include any such killing that, under
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.”).
33
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation art. I,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565(1) (defining aircraft sabotage and declaring that if
any person commits an offence unlawfully and intentionally, such as:
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if
that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which
renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in
flight; or
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material support or resources35 “for such an act if the act or provision
is engaged in by an [official] or agent of [the] foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office [] or agency.”36 Essentially,
the state-sponsored terrorism exception dismantled jurisdictional
roadblocks by giving U.S. federal courts the power to exercise subjectmatter jurisdiction over claims against foreign states.37

(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause
damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety inflight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight;
or
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.
This article also makes an individual liable if under subsection 2(b), that
individual “is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any
such offence” as stated in section 1.
34
See Terrorism Taking of Hostages Convention Between the United States
and other Governments, art. 1, June 3, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 11081 (stating that
“[any] person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person ([“hostage”]), in order to compel a third party, namely, a State,
an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a
group of person, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages
within the meaning of this Convention.”).
35
28 U.S.C.A. § 2339A (2009) (material support or resources “means
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials.”).
36
44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 140 (2013).
37
See Fisher v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 541 F. Supp.
2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (conferring subject matter jurisdiction over Libya in an action
arising out of a bombing of an airliner over Scotland); see also Kilburn v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 699 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (where the court had subject
matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims for personal injury and wrongful death
after victim of terrorist actions was kidnapped and ultimately killed in Iran).
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Moreover, the district court exercises original jurisdiction as to
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state where the court has
jurisdiction over the person with respect to which the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity either under Sections 1605-1607 of the FSIA
or under any international agreement.38 The FSIA protects a foreign
state from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless a specified exception
applies; only then will the federal court exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.39 However, once a
court has the power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the
suit, it may exercise all powers necessary to resolve the suit and
enforce whatever judgment it deems proper.40
In Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the former chief of the
Iranian armed forces was assassinated by Hezbollah, a terrorist
organization operating under the Islamic Jihad.41 His grandson
brought a suit on his behalf suing both the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) in the
U.S. District Court of D.C., claiming IIED and wrongful death.42 The
grandson further alleged that Iran and the MOIS materially supported
the Islamic Jihad by funding the terrorist group, and thus could not
assert sovereign immunity.43 The district court agreed and found that
Iran and MOIS were liable for the former chief’s murder.44 However,
after analyzing the grandson’s IIED claim, the district determined that
he lacked standing to bring suit.45 The court further determined that
because the former chief could not have brought an action if he was
still alive, the court had to dismiss the grandson’s wrongful-death
38

Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 240 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir.
2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976)).
39
Id. at 1149 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)).
40
Autotech Technologies LP v. Integral Research & Development Corp., 499
F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1451 (2008).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 839 (citing Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 498 F.Supp.2d 268,
279 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
45
Id. (citing Oveissi, 498 F.Supp.2d at 283).

441
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss2/8

8

Hunt: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Roadblocks to Recovery

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

claim.46 The grandson appealed and the D.C. Circuit determined that
subject-matter jurisdiction existed over the grandson’s claims because
(1) Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism; (2) the
grandson was U.S. citizen, and thus able to bring the claim on behalf
of his grandfather; and (3) his grandfather was assassinated in
France.47
Altogether, the FSIA confers jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims
presuming the plaintiff pleads an enumerated exception, such as the
state-sponsored terrorism exception. However, because the FSIA only
confers jurisdiction for the court to hear the plaintiff’s claim, the
plaintiff is obligated to plead a sufficient cause of action by pointing to
a viable state law claim like wrongful death and IIED.
II. CAUSE-OF-ACTION AGAINST A FOREIGN STATE
A. Liability under § 1605(a)(7)—the Flatow Amendment &
Ciccipio-Puelo.
A viable claim must be asserted to hold a foreign state liable once
U.S. courts have the power to exercise jurisdiction: “[The] FSIA is not
generally intended to affect the substantive law of liability or to affect
the primary conduct of foreign states.”48 Therefore, failing to assert a
viable cause of action could result in the foreign national’s claims
being dismissed. The FSIA does not provide for a substantive cause of
action or a choice-of-law provision once jurisdiction has been
asserted.49 However, section 1606 under the FSIA provides that where
a “foreign state [is] stripped of its immunity [‘it] shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”50 Therefore, where sovereign immunity is annulled,
the plaintiff may bring “state law claims that they could have brought
46

Id. at 839 (citing Oveissi, 498 F.Supp.2d at 279).
Id. at 844.
48
Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2012).
49
Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 841.
50
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2002)).
47
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if the defendant were a private individual.”51 Since plaintiffs are
required to indicate a specific substantive law, the FSIA is a conduit of
state-law principals, thus creating a pass-through effect on liability.
This section explores the legal impact that the Flatow Amendment
and Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran had on the statesponsored terrorism exception. The Flatow Amendment, applied in
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, allowed for increased
compensatory damages for terrorist victims and made punitive
damages available against foreign states. Cicippio-Puleo, contrarily,
refused to recognize a federal right to sue a foreign state without
pleading a state law claim.
1.

The Flatow Amendment and its Role.

The Flatow Amendment played a huge role in expanding the FSIA
subsequent to the AEDPA.52 The Flatow Amendment was enacted
under the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act. It was enacted
on September 30, 1996 after Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis University
student who was killed by a suicide bombing in the Gaza strip.”53 The
Flatow Amendment expressly provided for punitive damages in hopes
of combatting terrorism.54 Furthermore, with the Flatow Amendment,
Congress sought to advance the broader goal of the terrorism
exception by altering a foreign state’s conduct that engaged in
terrorism.55 Congressman Saxton, an active player in enacting the
Flatow Amendment, believed that “the only way to achieve the goal of
altering state conduct ‘was to impose massive civil liability on foreign
51

Id. at 841.
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 563 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008)).
53
Id. at 565 (one purpose of the Flatow Amendment was to increase the
measure of damages for terrorist victims. After enacting the Flatow Amendment, it
was essential for Congress to ensure the availability of receiving punitive damages
against agents of state sponsored terrorism to victims who died as a result of terrorist
acts, or who were severely injured).
54
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
55
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 565.
52
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state sponsors of terrorism whose conduct results in the death or
personal injury of United States citizens” by increasing punitive
damages.56 Therefore, the Flatow Amendment sought to expand the
state-sponsored terrorism exception by increasing punitive damages as
a means of altering a foreign state’s conduct that materially supports
terrorist organizations.57
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran was the first case to apply the
Flatow Amendment.58 In Flatow, Alisa Flatow, a U.S. citizen and
university student, was killed when a suicide bomber in Israel attacked
her tourist bus.59 Alisa was severely injured by a piece of shrapnel that
pierced into her skull casing and lodged into her brain.60 Alisa
eventually died from her injuries.61 Her family brought a wrongful
death action on her behalf against Iran and its officials.62 The court
held that, inter alia, the Flatows could recover under a state law theory
for wrongful death.63 In addition, the Flatow Amendment provided a
federal cause of action by expressly providing for punitive damages in
wrongful death cases.
The Flatow court explained that the Flatow Amendment was a
departure from the prior state-sponsored terrorism exception because
the FSIA completely prohibited the recovery of punitive damages
against a foreign state.64 However, the Flatow Amendment
disregarded that prior prohibition by expressly providing for a cause of
action for punitive damages because the FSIA was silent on the type of
remedies available.65 Where a terrorism victim brings a claim directly
against a foreign state under the state sponsored exception and the
56

Id. at 566.
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 25-26.
58
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 565; see Flatow, 999 F.Supp at 1.
59
Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 7.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 7-8.
62
Id. at 1.
63
Id. at 16, 18.
64
Id. at 25.
65
Id.
57
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Flatow Amendment, a foreign state can be indirectly liable for punitive
damages under the respondeat superior doctrine.66 Respondeat
superior applies where a foreign state “materially supports” a terrorist
organization because its tortious actions are the fault of the individual
foreign state.67
Providing “material support or assistance to a terrorist group” is
defined as providing currency or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, safe houses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, but does not include humanitarian assistance to persons not
directly involved in such violations.68
Consequently, if a foreign state provides routine financial
assistance to a terrorist group to help advance their terrorist activities,
that foreign state is vicariously liable for the personal injuries caused
by that terrorist group.69
The Flatow court determined that the Flatows’ were entitled to
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.70 In addition
to finding subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the court found that
Iran and MOIS were liable because they materially supported and
provided resources to the terrorist group that caused Alisa’s death.
After Flatow and the Flatow Amendment, those injured by terrorist
organizations were afforded a federal cause of action to receive
66

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 18.
68
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), with reference by incorporation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(a) (2009).
69
See Wachsman ex rel Wachsman v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (where the “Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of
Information and Security were not immune from suit under [FSIA] for the
extrajudicial killing a U.S. citizen who was abducted and executed by members of
terrorist group while residing in Israel; victim’s survivors established that Iran’s
material support to terrorist group proximately caused victim’s kidnapping and
execution, that Iran provided sanctioned support for terrorism through the [MOIS],
and that United States had designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism.”).
70
Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 33-34.
67
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punitive damages in addition to large compensatory damages.
Punitive damages were sought as a measure of deterrence to illustrate
to foreign states that their conduct will not be tolerated against U.S.
citizens. The following cases are examples of how the Flatow
Amendment’s large punitive damage awards were applied.
For example, in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court held
that $300,000,000 in punitive damages was an appropriate award
against Iran and Syria where several people were seriously injured
during a suicide bombing attack.71 The suicide bombing attack took
place at Rosh Ha’ir restaurant in Tel Aviv, Israel.72 A sixteen-year-old
boy, Daniel Wultz, and his father, Yekutiel “Tuly” Wultz, were among
those injured by the explosion.73 Daniel later died from his injuries;
his mother and siblings sued Iran and Syria under the state-sponsored
terrorism exception.74 The Wultz court stated that punitive damages
were made available under the revised FSIA terrorism exception in an
effort to punish and deter terrorist actions that are supported by foreign
states.75
Similarly, in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, $300,000,000
($150,000,000 per victim) in punitive damages was awarded where
two contractors were “kidnapped, held hostage, and finally, while their
captors videotaped the event, viciously slaughtered.”76 Their families
“brought state law claims against Syria, Syrian Military Intelligence,
President Bashar al-Assad, and director of Military Intelligence Asif
Shawkat, under the [FSIA].”77 The families alleged that the foreign

71

Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F.Supp.2d 24, 26-29 (D.C. Cir.

2012).
72

Id.
Id.
74
Id. at 27.
75
Id. at 41 (explaining that punitive damages meant to punish outrageous
behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the future by foreign states).
76
Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F.Supp.2d 53, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
77
Id.
73
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state “provided material support” to both Zarqawi and al-Qaeda which
led to the deaths of the U.S.-citizen contractors.78
In Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court awarded
$300,000,000 in punitive damages against Iran for assassinating Rabbi
Kahane and wounding two American citizens in 1990.79 The court
recognized that although a shooting is less horrific than a bombing,
both are deadly.80 The court stated that “[r]egardless of the severity of
the act, [it had] no doubt that Iran's intention [] in supporting terrorist
groups . . . [was] to create maximum harm through terrorist acts.”81
With the aim of deterring further terrorist attacks, large punitive
damage awards should be instituted as an effective deterrent
measure.82
Therefore, although the Flatow Amendment was only enacted as a
note to the state-sponsored terrorism exception, courts applied it as an
implied amendment; thus, expanding the realms of the FSIA.
2.

Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Rep. of Iran—There is no Implied
Federal cause-of-action.

After the FSIA’s expansion, the D.C. Circuit court refused to
follow Flatow and established its own position. In Cicippio-Puleo, the
D.C. Circuit ruled that Section 1605(a)(7) only allowed waiver of
immunity and that some other source of law was required to bring a
claim against a foreign state.83 Cicippio-Puleo states that the Flatow
Amendment only allows “a private right of action to sue “officials,
employees, and agents of foreign states for the conduct described in
§1605(a)(7),” which is different from pursuing actions against a
78
79

Id.
Acosta v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 30-31 (D.C. Cir.

2008).
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Cicippio-Puelo v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1028 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
81
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foreign state.84 Section 1605(a)(7) waives sovereign immunity where
money damages are sought for personal injury or death caused by an
act of terrorism, but it does not create a private cause of action. Where
“an official, employee, or agent of [a] foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency’ is engaged in
terrorism or materially supporting terrorism, sovereign immunity will
be deemed waived.”85 In essence, the D.C. Circuit found that the
FSIA creates a pass-through approach; neither §1605(a)(7) nor the
Flatow Amendment creates a private right of action against a foreign
government.86 Therefore, without a sufficient state law claim, the
plaintiff risks dismissal without recovery.87
Mr. Cicippio was a comptroller of the American University of
Beiruit.88 He was kidnapped in Beiruit, Lebanon by a terrorist group
named Hezbollah, beaten, kept in inhumane cells, and bound by
chains.89 Mr. Cicippio also suffered an array of medical problems and
he was forced to undergo abdomen surgery from which he bears a teninch scar.90 Mr. Cicippio and his wife brought actions against Iran and
MOIS and were awarded compensatory and punitive damages.
Thereafter, Mr. Cicippio’s adult children brought suit several years
later claiming loss of solatium (injury to a person’s feelings) and IIED
pursuant to the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception and the
Flatow Amendment.91
The district court dismissed the children’s claims, stating that the
court did not have jurisdiction and they failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.92 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal, reasoning that “‘[t]he language and
84

Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1032 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a)(7)(1996)).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1027.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1027-28.
91
Id. at 1028-30.
92
Id. at 1030; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
85
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history of the FSIA clearly established that the Act was not intended to
affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or
instrumentality.’”93 The court stated that the Flatow Amendment
creates a cause of action and it imposes liability, but that liability only
reaches to “an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated
as a state sponsor of terrorism.”94 The Flatow Amendment does not
include a foreign state.95 The D.C. Circuit stressed its point by
recognizing that the Flatow Amendment was headed in the right
direction.96 However, the court concluded “it is for Congress, not the
courts, to decide whether a cause of action should lie against foreign
states.”97 In that instance, the court refused “to imply a clause of
action against foreign states when Congress has not expressly
recognized one in the language of § 1605(a)(7) or the Flatow
Amendment.”98
The Cicippio-Puleo court posits that the “Supreme Court has also
made it clear that the federal courts should be loathe to ‘imply’ a cause
of action from a jurisdictional provision that ‘creates no cause of
action of its own force and effect … [and] imposes no liabilities.’”99
As mentioned previously, the FSIA does not affect substantive
liability, it only provides subject matter jurisdiction, assuming the
plaintiff points to an enumerated exception.100 Therefore, pleading an
exception to the FSIA waives sovereign immunity and the plaintiff
must “state a cause of action under some other source of law,
including state law,” to impose liability.101
Other courts soon followed suit and applied Cicippio-Puleo’s
determination to cases under the FSIA. For example, Nikbin v. Islamic
93

Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1033.
Id. at 1034.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1036.
99
Id. at 1033 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)).
100
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 11 (D.C. Cir 1998).
101
Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1036.
94
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Rep. of Iran ruled there is no cause of action against a foreign state
without creating a cause of action in substantive state law since the
FSIA only waives the foreign state’s sovereign immunity.102 Similarly,
Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya follows CicippioPuleo’s ruling by stating that Section 1605(a)(7) is ‘“merely a
jurisdiction-conferring provision that does not otherwise provide a
cause of action against either a foreign state or its agents.”103 There,
several American citizens were injured when their flight was bombed
in Brazzaville, Congo.104 As a result, six Libyan officers were sued
civilly and criminally tried. After the criminal trial, family members
of the bombing victims brought civil suits claiming IIED and wrongful
death. Defendants moved for a motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiffs
need to state claims with particularity. The court agreed and reasoned
that according to Cicippio-Puleo, their FSIA complaint has to allege
more in order to survive a motion to dismiss.105
Taken together, Cicippio-Puleo sought to halt a plaintiff’s ability
to recover damages over foreign states under the FSIA’s statesponsored terrorism exception and the Flatow Amendment.106
Cicippio-Puleo and its progenies required plaintiffs to plead a
sufficient claim that justifies liability separate from gaining subject
matter jurisdiction by the FSIA.107 Therefore, after Cicippio-Puleo’s
decision, plaintiffs incurred additional roadblocks in other jurisdictions
because Congress had not created a federal cause of action against
foreign states.108 The Seventh Circuit’s discussion and analysis of
Cicippio-Puelo illustrates a curtailing of plaintiffs’ rights; therefore,
102

Nikbin v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2006 WL 23849151, at
5* (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032).
104
Id. at 1.
105
Id. at 5.
106
See Cicippio- Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1024.
107
Id.; see also Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp. 2d. 1*, 35*
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding as Cicippio-Puelo does that suing a foreign state under
the FSIA’s exception requires more than a bare bones pleading of a state law causeof-action).
108
Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1036.
103
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Congress responded swiftly by repealing the state-sponsored terrorism
statute.
B.

Amendment and Repealing of §1605(a)(7) by Congress.

In 2008, Congress amended the Act so its intention would have
full effect after Cicippio-Puleo interpreted and applied the statesponsored terrorism exception so narrowly.109 Congress enacted
section1605A, providing a private right of action under subsection (c)
where:
a foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of terrorism
[] and any official, employee, or agent of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment, or agency, shall be liable to—(1) a
national of the United States, (2) a member of the
armed forces, (3) an employee of the Government of
the United States, or of an individual performing a
contract awarded by the United States Government,
acting within the scope of the employee’s employment,
or (4) the legal representative of a person described in
paragraph[s] (1), (2), or (3), for personal injury or death
caused by acts described in subsection (a)(1) of that
foreign state, or of an official, employee of that foreign
state, for which the courts of the United States may
maintain jurisdiction under this section for money
damages. In any such action, damages may include
economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and
punitive damages. In any such action, a foreign state
shall be vicariously liable for the acts of its officials,
employees, or agents. (emphasis added).
By amending the Act, Congress afforded comfort to victims by
granting a private right of action to sue a foreign state.110 Cicippio109
110

28 U.S.C.A. §1605A(2008).
Id.
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Puleo had said that a federal cause of action to sue a foreign state
would be in the right direction but that Congress had to act; it was not
the courts’ duty to find an action where one did not exist.111 Victims of
state-sponsored terrorism now enjoy expanded rights under the
amended Act because Congress eliminated the inconsistent application
of the law by clarifying its original intent to U.S. courts.”112
The D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to apply this new
Amendment. For example, in Estate of Doe v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, an
action was brought against Iran alleging that it materially supported a
terrorist group which was responsible for bombing two U.S. Embassy
facilities in Beirut, Lebanon where 58 foreign national employees and
one U.S. national employee of the U.S. Government were working and
therefore injured or killed as a result of the attack.113 The court held
that where the plaintiffs had originally filed suit under the original
FSIA exception and commenced a new action in a timely manner
under the new FSIA exception, an action was available.114 Similarly,
in Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Rep., the court reached the same conclusion
and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed under the new FSIA terrorism
exception. 115 Providing plaintiffs met the FSIA’s state-sponsored
terrorism exception under Section 1605A, a private cause of action
attached to the foreign state as well as an agent of the state.116
Although still challenging, the new FSIA exception provided
relief to American citizens, employees or soldiers of the U.S.
government, and sent a signal that their claims mattered. Courts have
held that those who brought claims under the original FSIA terrorism
exception had a right of action under the new FSIA terrorism

111

Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1036.
Israel Law Center, FSIA (Feb. 4, 2013, 3:30 PM),
http://www.israellawcenter.org/hebrew/page.asp?id=334&show=reports#Foreign.
113
Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
114
Id. at 16-17.
115
Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 736 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
116
28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008).
112
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exception.117 The courts retroactively applied the new right of action
provided plaintiffs commenced an action within 60 days after the entry
of judgment against the foreign state in a timely filed related action
which arose out of the same incident.118 It is apparent that some
jurisdictional and cause-of-action roadblocks were dismantled;
families could start their healing processes.119
117

See Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F.Supp.2d *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 784 F. Supp.2d *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Anderson v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (for a retroactive
application analysis to claims that were previously rejected by terrorism victims).
118
See Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d *1 (plaintiffs allowed to retroactively apply the
FSIA new amendment that created a new independent federal cause of action against
foreign sovereign for terrorism-related claims, in an effort to seek punitive
damages); Anderson v. The Islamic Rep. of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(where states-sponsored terrorism exception applied retroactively to the suit brought
by several family members of servicemen who were severely injured during a
bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut against Islamic Rep. of Iran and the
Iranian Ministry of Information and Security); Murphy v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 740
F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs and intervenors the right to
retroactively apply the new FSIA provision against Iran for the bombing of the
Marine barracks in Lebanon).
119
154 Cong. Rec. S54-01 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
Mr. Lautenberg speaks in the Congressional hearing of the 110 th Congress,
Second Session about the original intent and effects of the FSIA. Mr.
Lautenberg states, in part:
In 1996, Congress created the “state sponsored terrorism
exception” to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, FSIA. This exception
allows victims of terrorism to sue those nations designated as state sponsors
of terrorism by the Department of State for terrorist acts they commit or for
which they provide material support. Congress subsequently passed the
Flatow Amendment to the FSIA, which allows victims of terrorism to seek
meaningful damages, such as punitive damages, from state sponsors of
terrorism for the horrific acts of terrorist murder and injury committed or
supported by them.
Congress's original intent behind the 1996 legislation has
been muddied by numerous court decisions. For example, the
courts decided in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran that
there is no private right of action against foreign governments-as
opposed to individuals-under the Flatow Amendment. Since this
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CURRENT EFFECT OF THE STATE-SPONSORED TERRORIST
EXCEPTION & THE LEIBOVITCH DECISION
A.

Limitations of §1605A

Certain limitations still exist before a U.S. court will hear a claim
under the FSIA’s terrorism exception: (1) the foreign state has to be
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism; (2) the claimant or victim
has to be a U.S. national, member of the armed forces, or employee of
the government; or (3) is an individual performing a contract awarded
by the United States Government and acting within the scope of their
employment.120 If the claimant fulfills these three elements, a U.S.
decision, judges have been prevented from applying a uniform
damages standard to all victims in a single case because a victim's
right to pursue an action against a foreign government depends
upon State law. My provision in this bill fixes this problem by
reaffirming the private right of action under the Flatow
Amendment against the foreign state sponsors of terrorism
themselves.
My provision in this bill also addresses a part of the law
which until now has granted foreign states an unusual procedural
advantage. As a general rule, interim court orders cannot be
appealed until the court has reached a final disposition on the case
as a whole. However, foreign states have abused a narrow
exception to this bar on interim appeals-the collateral order
doctrine-to delay justice for, and the resolution of, victim's suits. In
Beecham v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Libya has
delayed the claims of dead and injured U.S. service personnel who
were off duty when attacked by Libyan agents at the Labelle
Discothe2que in Berlin in 1986. These delays have lasted for many
years, as the Libyans have taken or threatened to take frivolous
collateral order doctrine appeals whenever possible. My provision
will eliminate the ability of state sponsors of terrorism to utilize
the collateral order doctrine. My legislation sends a clear and
unequivocal message to Libya. Its refusal to act in good faith will
no longer be tolerated by Congress.
120

28 U.S.C. § 1605A(2)(i)-(iii)(2008); see also Michael Rosenhouse, J.D.,
Annotation, State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign States and
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court will exercise subject matter and personal jurisdiction over their
claims. However, courts must be knowledgeable in their application
of the federal cause of action or the private right of action enumerated
under section 1605A(c).
B.

Leibovitch’s Outcome

During the summer of 2003, the Leibovitch family was traveling
in their minivan on the Trans Israel highway near, Kalkilya, a town
bordering the West Bank.121 Soon after crossing the West Bank,
members of the Palestine Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”)122 crossed into Israel
from the West Bank and opened fire on the Leibovitch family,123
causing grave harm to two of the Leibovitch children.124 As a result of
the attack, N.L., a seven-year-old Israeli national, died and S.L., a
three-year-old American citizen, was seriously wounded by bullets
that shattered bones in her right wrist and pierced her torso.125 The
girls had two grandparents and two siblings in the minivan that also
survived the attack.126 They all witnessed N.L’s tragic death and S.L.’s
horrific injuries.127
In 2008, the Leibovitch family brought suit against Iran for
each family member in the minivan that was attacked by the PIJ and
for N.L. and S.L’s parents (foreign nationals) who were not present
during the attack. 128 After the trial court entered a default order
against Iran, the court determined that “S.L. was injured in ‘an act of
their Property under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1
(2002).
121
Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012).
122
Id.; see also Meir Litvak, Palestine Islamic Jihad – Background
Information, Jewish Virtual Library, (April 27, 2013, 3:00 PM),
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/tau56.html.
123
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 562.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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… extrajudicial killing’ under the FSIA exception for terrorism.”129 In
addition, the district court found Iran vicariously liable for injuries that
resulted from the PIJ’s attack because Iran had provided material
support and resources to the PIJ for its campaign on extrajudicial
killing.130
The Leibovitch court faced two determinations regarding section
1605A’s jurisdictional scope. The first issue was whether
section1605A specifically tracks the new private right of action which
excludes most foreign nationals even if they are family members, or
whether Cicippio-Puleo’s pass-through approach (merely granting
jurisdiction but no right to sue) survives Congress’ substantial revision
of the FSIA’s terrorism provision.”131 The second issue was whether
S.L. is considered a victim under section1605A(a)(7).132
C.

Analysis

First, the Seventh Circuit concluded that § 1605A tracks a new
private right of action.133 The court concluded “that Congress intended
to confer jurisdiction over the Leibovitchs’ [IIED] claim.”134 In doing
so, the court analyzed Congress’ revision of Section 1605A and
disengaged Cicippio-Puleo and its progenies’ previous arguments.135
The Seventh Circuit found that Congress eliminated a huge
inconsistency created by Cicippio-Puleo by “slightly amend[ing] the
language to waive sovereign immunity if ‘neither the claimant nor the
victim was a national of the U.S. … when the act upon which the
claim is based occurred.’”136 Therefore, the court found that Congress
“established a private right of action principally for American
129

Id.; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008).
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 562.
131
Id. at 564.
132
Id. at 572.
133
Id. at 569.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 570.
136
Id.at 570.
130
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claimants while waiving sovereign immunity in a broader set of cases
also involving American victims.”137 The court noted that Congress did
not indicate that its Amendment narrowed the original scope of
jurisdiction.138 Rather, the purpose of § 1605A(c) was to “extend
punitive damages to foreign nations sponsoring terrorism and thereby
allow the massive liability judgments [to] deter state support for
terrorism.”139 Essentially, the court found that Congress intended for
the Leibovitch’s to “‘have the benefit’ of the FSIA’s jurisdictional
provisions even if they could not make use of the federal cause of
action” created under the Flatow Amendment.140
Second, the Seventh Circuit determined that S.L. was a victim
although her sister, N.L., was a foreign national and S.L. was killed by
an extrajudicial killing.141 Based on § 1605A’s House Report, ‘“[the]
intent of the drafters was that a family should have the benefit of these
provisions if either the victim of the act or the survivor who brings the
claim is an American citizen.”142
Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran defines victim as “those who
suffered injury or died as a result of the attack and claimants as those
whose claims arise out of those injuries or deaths but who might not
be victims themselves.”143 S.L. was an American citizen and a victim
of state sponsored terrorism when she was severely injured by bullets
that shattered her torso and wrist.144 N.L., however, was murdered by
an act of extrajudicial killing.145
The Seventh Circuit concluded that although S.L. was not a
victim of extrajudicial killing, she was a victim of the same terrorist
act that killed her sister because she suffered severe injuries as a result
137

Id. at 571.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 570.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 570 (citing H.R. Rep. No.105-48, pt. 1, 2 (1996)).
143
Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
144
Leibovitch, 697 F.3d. at 562, 570.
145
Id. at 572 (citing § 1605A(a)(1) (2008)).
138
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of the attack.146 Therefore, jurisdiction existed over the Leibovitches
claims that were derived from S.L.’s injuries.147 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded it for further
proceedings consistent with its holding.148 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that Section 1605A “not only confers jurisdiction but also
includes a private right of action, a remedy not offered under any other
exception to sovereign immunity.”149 The Seventh Circuit made the
right decision by following Congressional intent and the language of
the new Amendment to hold in favor of the Leibovitches. Like many
other families, the Leibovitches could receive a remedy for their
horrific ordeal and began their healing process.
CONCLUSION
After the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception was
expanded and narrowed, Congress eliminated legal inconsistencies
enacted by U.S. courts. The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide many of
these state-sponsored terrorism cases. However, Leibovitch set a
groundwork that lower courts in the Seventh Circuit must follow. In
Leibovitch, the Seventh Circuit brilliantly explained and applied
Congress’s intent to make this exception broader and more available to
claimants because victims like S.L. will be deprived of adequate relief
for their injuries without it. The FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism
exception was created and has always been advanced as a measure to
deter foreign states from harming or killing American citizens.
Furthermore, although it appears that the roadblocks to FSIA litigation
have been dismantled, only time will tell when the Seventh Circuit
decides more cases on this limited issue of the state-sponsored
terrorism exception.
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Id.
Id.
148
Id. at 573.
149
Id. at 570.
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